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In “Performance Philosophy — Staging a New Field,” Laura Cull approaches performance as a 
source of philosophical insight and philosophy as a species of performance (Cull 2014, 15). This 
calls for a radical transformation of philosophy and its practices. What form might this take? 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy provides one example. The language games presented in the 
opening remarks of the Philosophical Investigations (PI, [1953] 2001) are meant to be played out. 
They involve improvisation based on general scenes, stock characters, and linguistic play. When 
enacted, they are slapstick. As such, they offer a method of philosophical investigation in which 
clarity and insight are inherent in the performance itself. Wittgenstein’s language games were 
directly influenced by the subversive practices of Austrian commedia dell’arte and slapstick (through 
the works of Johann Nestroy and Karl Kraus). By their very nature, they challenge the pretensions 
of philosophical explanation and theory. Unlike attempts to compare Wittgenstein’s philosophy to 
theatre, enacting language games is a form of philosophical performance. Andrew Lugg notes that 
recent attempts to compare Wittgenstein’s philosophy to theatre problematize the opening 
remarks of the Investigations. However, enacting language games as a form of philosophical 
performance makes what is hidden, in all of its simplicity and familiarity, obvious, striking, and 
engaging.1 
Wittgenstein’s move from the Tractatus to the Investigations is the story of a gesture. Ray Monk 
writes that: 
one anecdote […] was told by Wittgenstein to both Malcolm and von Wright, and 
has since been retold many times. It concerns a conversation in which Wittgenstein 
insisted that a proposition and that which it describes must have the same ‘logical 
form’ […]. To this idea, Sraffa made a Neapolitan gesture of brushing his chin with 
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his fingertips, asking: ‘What is the logical form of that?’ This, according to the story, 
broke the hold on Wittgenstein of the Tractarian idea that a proposition must be a 
‘picture’ of the reality it describes. (Monk 1991, 260–1) 
In the repeated telling of this story, Wittgenstein acknowledges the power of gesture to break the 
hold of philosophical ideas, and in so doing sets the tone and scene for his later work. It is a 
moment of slapstick.2  The breaking of the Tractarian idea ushers in important philosophical 
changes. Logical analysis gives way to grammatical investigation as Wittgenstein moves from a list 
of numbered propositions to language games. This not only represents a shift from static to 
moving pictures, but from serious logical analysis to comedic grammatical investigation.  
Wittgenstein’s art of grammatical investigation was inspired by the theatre of turn-of-the-century 
Vienna. In particular, he was influenced by the works of two prominent Austrian playwrights; 
Johann Nestroy and Karl Kraus. Nestroy’s plays were recognized as an Austrian version of 
commedia dell’arte (Knight and Fabry 1967, 19).3 They influenced not only Karl Kraus and Bertolt 
Brecht, but popular German and Austrian political cabarets during the last years of Franz Joseph I 
and between the two world wars, especially during the rise of totalitarianism. Nestroy and Kraus 
attempted to challenge the complacent rationality of their age. Only comedy and grammatical 
improvisation appeared equal to the task, for words had lost their meaning and “imagination was 
the only check against the barbarism of modern man who, daring to analyze all human values, was 
able to cheapen human life and discount any idea of human dignity” (Iggers 1967, 203). This is 
consistent with the aims and goals of commedia dell’arte and slapstick which, in response to “man’s 
inhumanity to man,” offer a healthy deflation of dangerous pretenses and pompous self-
deception. In the words of Charlie Chaplin, “through humour, we see in what seems rational, the 
irrational; in what seems important, the unimportant” and vice versa (Madden 1975, 132).  
The motto Wittgenstein chooses for the Investigations is from Nestroy’s play The Protégé, and reads: 
“It is in the nature of progress to appear much greater than it actually is.” Within the play, these 
words are an acknowledgement that little social and physical evil has been eradicated from the 
world. It is a serious and solemn claim. However, Nestroy notes that “seriousness has a solemn 
side, a sad side, and many grave sides, but it also has a little spot of electricity from which, with the 
proper friction, the sparks of humor fly” (Knight and Fabry 1967, 16). In his choice of motto, 
Wittgenstein presents himself as Nestroy’s protégé. And in the text that follows, he attempts to 
debunk the greatness, the seriousness, and the pretensions of philosophy. In the Investigations, for 
example, Wittgenstein alters Nestroy’s friction metaphor and applies it to the Tractatus itself. He 
writes: 
The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of language was, of 
course, not a result of investigation, it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes 
intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty.—We have got 
on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions 
are ideal, but also, just because of that we are unable to walk. We want to walk; so 
we need friction. Back to rough ground! (PI 107) 
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From the ideal conditions of the Tractatus, which are in danger of becoming empty, Wittgenstein 
calls for friction and directs us back to rough ground. The tone of the Tractatus itself is challenged 
by the slapstick image of attempting to walk on ice (perhaps with arms flailing and feet flying); a 
philosophical attempt that hoists Wittgenstein on his own petard. A few remarks later, he 
compares the depth of philosophy to the depth of a grammatical joke (PI 111). 
Language games are an integral part of Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations. They exhibit 
three of the defining characteristics of commedia dell’arte and slapstick: i) improvisation based on 
general scenes, ii) stock characters, and iii) linguistic play (Madden 1975, 2). In the opening remarks 
of the Investigations, Augustine’s description of the learning of human language is followed by a 
shopping example and the language game of the builders. Wittgenstein writes: 
Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a 
slip marked “five red apples”. He takes the slip to a shopkeeper, who opens the 
drawer marked “apples”; then he looks up the word “red” in a table and finds a 
colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers—I assume 
he knows them by heart—up to the word “five” and for each number he takes an 
apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. (PI 1) 
And: 
Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. […] 
A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams. B has 
to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. (PI 2)  
These general scenes call for improvisation on the words, actions, and nonverbal projections of 
their characters. Given the limitations of sketchy scenes, stock characters, and linguistic play, 
“gestures must speak” (Madden 1975, 106). By enacting these scenes, we come to recognize that 
Augustine’s description of his elders in the opening remark of the Investigations is a description of 
commedia or slapstick characters:  
Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural 
language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the 
movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our 
state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. (PI 1) 
The idea that Augustine’s elders express themselves in slapstick should give us both pleasure and 
pause. For the simplicity and exaggeration of commedia and slapstick involve complex and 
sophisticated uses of language and imagination. (They involve already having a language [or two] 
only not this one.) The silence of early slapstick films, like the silence of Augustine’s written 
confessions, is only possible against the backdrop of spoken language. Wittgenstein confirms this 
when he writes that “Augustine describes the learning of human language as if a child came into a 
strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a 
language, only not this one.” “As if,” he continues, “the child could already think, only not yet speak” 
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(PI 32). Developing this insight further, the opening quotation from Augustine’s Confessions, and 
Wittgenstein’s subsequent shopping example, could both be depicted in silent film. In the shopping 
example, Wittgenstein hands the shopper a slip marked “five red apples,” and neither the shopper 
nor the shopkeeper speak to one another. (The use of quotation marks and dashes throughout 
the Investigations often evoke the intertitles of silent films.) Slapstick reveals the limitations of 
Augustine’s description with a clarity and immediacy not possible in theory. 
With the language game of the builders, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a language for which the 
description given by Augustine is right. It is an example that is meant to be played out. There are 
various ways to imagine and enact this scene. Scholars and students often imagine a scene 
unfolding in silence; with builder A and assistant B slowly, ploddingly, moving individual building 
stones from one place to another. These builders are compared to cave men, trained animals, 
marionettes, or automata (see, for example, Goldfarb 2006; Rhees 1980; Ring 1983). 4  Such 
descriptions suggest silent film. But why not imagine or enact this scene as commedia or slapstick? 
Imagine the language game of the builders; only this time builder A and assistant B are Abbot and 
Costello, or Laurel and Hardy. For example, imagine the language game of the builders as part of 
Laurel and Hardy’s 1928 film The Finishing Touch (in which they attempt to “finish” a house and, in 
the process, destroy it). “A calls out ‘block,’ ‘pillar,’ ‘slab,’ and ‘beam,’ and B has to pass the stones in 
the order in which A needs them” (PI 2). Imagine A teaching B the use of these words, and expanding 
their language to include i) a series of words used as numerals, ii) the words “this” and “there,” and 
iii) colour samples (PI 7–8). Further, imagine a language game in which A asks and B reports the 
number of blocks in a pile, or the colour and shapes of the building stones that are stacked in such-
and-such a place (PI 21). Wittgenstein asks, “What is the difference between the report or statement 
“Five slabs” and the order “Five slabs!”?” Imagine mixing them up: An order is given and instead of 
bringing the slabs, assistant B simply repeats the words (in imitation, in mockery, in confusion, or 
in confirmation of A’s order or report). (Perhaps assistant B is the Count on Sesame Street: “One, 
two, three, four, five slabs, ha, ha, ha.”) Or, perhaps, assistant B confuses numerals, nouns, and 
verbs (getting the order or the report wrong). (Think of Abbot and Costello’s routine “Who’s on 
First?”) Such scenes provoke laughter, not metaphysical angst. But they are no less philosophically 
important because of it. 
Tom Stoppard presents a variation on the language game of the builders in his play Dogg’s Hamlet, 
Cahoot’s Macbeth ([1979] 1980).5 The play begins with an off-stage voice yelling “Brick!” A football is 
thrown from off-stage left to off-stage right, and a voice answers “Cube!” Later, a lorry-driver aids 
several schoolboys in building a stage (for a play within the play). Blocks, slabs, planks, and cubes 
are thrown from the lorry (and thrown back and forth between various characters). A wall is built, 
knocked down, and rebuilt several times, and each time random letters on the blocks spell different 
words. The dramatic conceit is that the schoolboys speak one language and the lorry-driver speaks 
another, although they are initially unaware of this fact. In one language, the words “block,” “slab,” 
“plank,” and “cube” name the objects with which we are familiar, while in the other, the word “block” 
means “next,” the word “slab” means “okay,” the word “plank” means “ready,” and the word “cube” 
means “thank you.” The scene is filled with slapstick. Within the play, different meanings of the 
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same word sometimes cause hesitation or confusion; sometimes cause injury or insult; while at 
other times their coincidence is without incident. 
Wittgenstein includes the possibility of humour and jokes in one of his own variations on the 
language game of the builders. In §15, he introduces the use of proper names through the 
introduction of tools bearing certain marks. “When A shows his assistant such a mark, he brings 
the tool that has that mark on it” (PI 15). Wittgenstein then asks: 
But has […] a name which has never been used for a tool also got a meaning in that 
game?—Let us assume that ‘X’ is such a sign and that A gives this sign to B—well, 
even such signs could be given a place in the language game, and B might have, 
say, to answer them too with a shake of the head. (One might imagine this as a sort 
of joke between them.) (PI 42) 
John Mighton imagines something similar in his play Possible Worlds (1988), where a language 
consists of only four words: “block,” “pillar,” “slab,” and “hilarious”. All of these works investigate 
the concept of meaning through the presentation of words and the actions into which they are 
woven. Playing a language game for which Augustine’s description is right reveals the limitations 
of his description. Augustine describes a system of communication, only not everything we call 
language is this system. 
And one has to say this in many cases where the question arises “Is this an 
appropriate description or not?” The answer is: “Yes, it is appropriate, but only for 
this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to 
describe.” (PI 3) 
Augustine’s concept of meaning has its place in a simple idea of the way language functions, but it 
is also the idea of a language simpler than our own (PI 3). Wittgenstein’s slapstick response 
addresses both the idea and its description simultaneously. 
Wittgenstein anticipates that he might be accused of tacitly assuming that the builders think (as 
Augustine does); that they are like people as we know them in this respect, and that they do not 
act merely mechanically (Zettel [Z] 99). He responds: 
What am I to reply to this? Of course it is true that the life of those men must be 
like ours in many respects, and I have said nothing about this similarity. But the 
important thing is that their language, and their thinking too, may be rudimentary, 
that there is such a thing as ‘primitive thinking’ which is to be described via primitive 
behaviour. The surroundings are not the ‘thinking accompaniment’ of speech. (Z 
99) 
Not only is thinking exhibited in such language games, it also takes place through our enactment 
of them. Wittgenstein advises:  
Do not be troubled by the fact that [such languages] consist only of orders […] for 
it is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle.—Or 
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a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. 
And innumerable others.— (PI 18–19) 
He purposely sets limitations. To imagine or enact simple language games is not to go back to a 
theoretical beginning, but to arrive at simplicity after complexity. According to Wittgenstein, 
philosophical pictures and ideas can surround the working of language in a haze that makes clear 
vision impossible (PI 5). It disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds 
of application, in which we can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of words (PI 7). 
The use of [a] word in the ordinary circumstances of our life is of course extremely 
familiar to us. But the part the word plays in our life, and therewith the language 
game in which we employ it, would be difficult to describe even in rough outline (PI 
156). 
The expression “language game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that speaking a 
language is part of an activity (PI 23). Slapstick brings this neglected aspect of language to our 
attention. Martin Puchner suggests that Sprachspiel (language game) be translated as “language 
play” (alluding to both games and theatre) (Puchner 2015, 107). The simplicity (and inherent 
exaggeration) of these scenes is precisely their point. 
Consistent with commedia dell’arte and slapstick, Wittgenstein also introduces a set of stock 
characters who appear and reappear throughout his writings. They include a child and his elders; 
a shopper and a shopkeeper; and builder A and his assistant B. In so doing, Wittgenstein draws 
from a variety of cultural, literary, and theatrical antecedents. His shopping example alludes to 
passages from Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ([1785] 1977) and Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit ([1807] 1977), while also introducing a recognizable commedia character; 
the Viennese shopkeeper. In the Groundwork, Kant presents the example of a shopkeeper who 
does not overcharge inexperienced customers (so that even a child may buy from him) (Kant 4, 
397). Hegel, on the other hand, compares the results of science to rows of closed and labelled 
boxes in a grocer’s stall (Hegel 1977, 31). 6  To Kant’s shopkeeper in Hegel’s grocer’s stall, 
Wittgenstein sends someone shopping with a slip marked “five red apples.” Instead of Kantian will 
and dead, boxed matter, Wittgenstein introduces characters who act and interact with one 
another. He sets the scene in motion, and the philosophical examples (which were previously 
merely illustrative) come to life. 
Like commedia dell’arte, Wittgenstein’s language games also involve linguistic play; words from 
different languages, regional dialects, nonsense sounds, and exaggerated tones of voice and 
gesture are all mixed up together. (The titles and intertitles of silent slapstick films also involve 
linguistic play.) Wittgenstein’s awareness (and embrace) of such linguistic play is confirmed, not 
only in the language games and grammatical jokes that permeate his later writings, but in passages 
like the following from Culture and Value (CV, 1980): 
Aus dem Simplicissimus: Rätsel der Technik. (Bild: Zwei Professoren vor einer im Bau 
befindlichen Brücke.) Stimme von oben: “Laß abi - hüah - laß abi sag’ i - nacha drah’n 
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mer’n anders um!” - - “Es ist doch unfaßlich, Herr Kollega, daß eine so komplizierte und 
exakte Arbeit in dieser Sprache zustande kommen kann.” (CV 15) 
 
From Simplicissimus: Riddles of technology. (A picture of two professors in front of 
a bridge under construction.) Voice from above: “Fotch it dahn -- coom on fotch it 
dahn A tell tha -- we’ll turn it t’other rooad sooin” -- “It really is quite 
incomprehensible, my dear colleague, how anyone can carry out such complicated 
and precise work in such language.” (CV 15e) 
Simplicissimus was a German weekly satirical magazine (published from 1896–1967, with a hiatus 
between 1944–54). Peter Winch, the translator of Culture and Value, notes that he is grateful to Mr. 
S. Ellis of the Institute of Dialect and Folk Life Studies at the University of Leeds for the rendering 
of this passage. Presented as a riddle, it is a joke at the expense of the author of the Tractatus 
himself. 
The language game of the builders is played out from §§2–48 of the Investigations, and offers rich 
and varied insights into language, meaning, understanding (etc.). In all of its variations, this 
language game is not about the builders, it is about challenging our own philosophical pictures and 
ideas through the use of imagination and improvisation. Wittgenstein writes that we must do away 
with all explanation, and he offers slapstick in place of theory and argumentation (PI 109). The 
language game of the builders is an alternative to theoretical constructs, and a critique of logical 
forms of analysis. The Investigations is filled with dialogue, questions, exclamations, and extensive 
punctuation that draw attention to the performative aspect of this work. As Nestroy and Kraus 
understood, no explanation can capture the electricity from which the sparks of humour and 
insight fly. No explanation can make Wittgenstein’s language game funny or illuminating if you do 
not get it (or play it). And any explanation will kill both the humour and the insight if you do.  
Wittgenstein’s language games are a source of philosophical insight. When limitations are set, we 
must employ our imagination to discover possibilities. Limitations become a source of investigative 
freedom. This alters the practice of philosophy, its audience (or readership), and its goals. Clarity 
and insight are inherent in the playing of language games themselves, and not in arguments, 
explanations, or theories that might result from, or exist independently of, their performance. 
Improvisation provides scope for individual inventiveness, while at the same time allowing 
ensembles (whether students, philosophers, or actors) to function at their most creative. It also 
encourages the imagination of readers or spectators. In his study of commedia dell’arte and 
slapstick, David Madden writes that “actors and audiences participate in a metaphysical conspiracy 
to raise the stock and the standard to the level of art” (Madden 1975, 153). This is also required 
when reading and responding to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Creating friction, and leaving such 
moments to the imagination is an expression of Wittgenstein’s humour, playfulness, and respect 
for others. In a world in which imagination is being destroyed because nothing is left to it, 
philosophy enacted as commedia dell’arte or slapstick is an important bequest (Iggers 1967, 95). 
Recognizing and enacting Wittgenstein’s language games as slapstick dramatically alters our 
understanding of (and engagement with) the opening remarks of the Investigations. Andrew Lugg 
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criticizes recent attempts to compare Wittgenstein’s philosophy to theatre for problematizing 
these opening remarks: 
Until recently, §§1–7 of the Philosophical Investigations were mostly taken literally, 
and Wittgenstein understood as expecting the reader to treat what he says as it 
stands. Lately, however, the sections have come to be seen as requiring careful 
interpretation (and reinterpretation), and Wittgenstein seen as wishing the reader 
to question his remarks, even dispute them. […] In particular, the examples of the 
shopkeeper and the builders in §1 and §2, examples once routinely judged 
unproblematic, are now frequently held to be problematic, if not out-and-out 
unintelligible, and the rest of the material is interpreted to accommodate this new 
interpretation. Instead of taking the sections to express exactly what Wittgenstein 
wanted to say, we are to look beyond his words to his deeper intentions, his true 
meaning being more subtle and more critical than it appears at first sight. (Lugg 
2013, 20) 
Lugg challenges interpretations that claim Wittgenstein’s shopping example “reads as if it 
reproduced a skit written by Beckett or Ionesco and is better suited to the theatre of the absurd” 
(Lugg 2013, 25). He also challenges readings that describe or dismiss language games as 
“behavioural pantonimes” or “particular muted fantasies.” He notes that skits by Beckett and 
Ionesco are coherent enough to be performed, although he does not acknowledge that Beckett 
himself was influenced by commedia and slapstick. He also writes that the scenario of the 
shopkeeper, although unusual and strange, could be filmed (Lugg 2013, 24). Both commedia and 
slapstick are recognizable forms of theatre, but they are not theatre of the absurd. Lugg quotes 
with approval Gasking and Jackson’s description of Wittgenstein’s 1930–32 lectures as attempts to 
work his way into and through a question, in the natural order and in the non-technical way in 
which any completely sincere man thinking to himself would come to it (Lugg 2013, 34). He also 
acknowledges that “Wittgenstein wanted to introduce the topic of meaning, and bring into play the 
question of how “one operates with words” at the beginning of the book” (Lugg 2013, 26, emphasis 
added). Enacting Wittgenstein’s language games as slapstick is one possible way of bringing such 
questions into play (and working ourselves into and through them). 
Lugg argues that there is no need to read Wittgenstein’s philosophy as ironic, evasive, or 
ambiguous (Lugg 2013, 20). And I agree. However, he equates taking Wittgenstein at his word with 
reading his work literally: 
The views he introduces, the questions he raises, and the suggestions he floats are 
best understood literally.... When the sections are read, as they are presumably 
meant to be read, starting at the beginning, they do not require supplementation 
or embellishment, only clarification and explanation. The hard thing, as so often in 
Wittgenstein’s case, is to take him at his word and not read into what he says what 
is not there. (Lugg 2013, 20–21) 
While asserting that Wittgenstein’s opening remarks do not require supplementation or 
embellishment, Lugg acknowledges that they may require clarification and explanation. 
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Recognizing the slapstick nature of language games suggests that clarification and explanation 
may be two different things, and that clarification can take the form of commedia or slapstick. As 
noted above, Wittgenstein encourages us to do away with explanation (PI 109). He suggests that if 
we are haunted by explanations, we neglect to remind ourselves of the most important facts (Z 
220). Such neglect is both philosophical and aesthetic. Significantly, there is nothing in Lugg’s 
reading of §§1–7 that is incompatible with enacting language games as slapstick, for such 
enactment does not look beyond Wittgenstein’s words for deeper intentions or a more subtle or 
critical meaning. Humorously, it does just the opposite (and this humour is not ironic). Further, 
creative engagement with Wittgenstein’s text is not a veiled response to philosophical evasiveness 
or ambiguity. To respond to language games as commedia is, in fact, one way to take Wittgenstein 
at his word.   
The difference between Lugg’s reading of §§1–7 and the one presented in this paper involves 
Wittgenstein’s request that we imagine the examples and language games presented in the 
opening remarks of the Investigations. Lugg cautions against reading into (or out of) Wittgenstein’s 
texts things that are not there. However, engaging creatively with the text (through improvisation 
and linguistic play) enacts philosophy in the space between us. The resulting readings or 
enactments are not implicit in the text, nor attributable to Wittgenstein alone. Rather, they 
complement the text and encourage a state of philosophical discovery. In his paper, Lugg hopes to 
have shown that “nothing needs to be added—aside from elucidation and amplification—to make 
the sections intelligible or worthy of inclusion” (Lugg 2013, 33). It is my hope that this paper 
demonstrates that elucidation and amplification can take a variety of different forms, without 
violating the spirit or letter of Wittgenstein’s writings. Unlike approaches that find the opening of 
the Investigations problematic or unintelligible, recognizing and responding to Wittgenstein’s 
language games as commedia or slapstick makes what is hidden, in all of its simplicity and 
familiarity, obvious, striking, and engaging.  
Wittgenstein’s slapstick enriches and expands our philosophical practices, and is itself an 
important source of philosophical insight. It offers an example of performance philosophy in which 
performance is not merely illustrative, and philosophy is not merely theoretical. Rather, a radically 
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1 According to Wittgenstein, “the aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real 
foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him.—And this 
means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful” (PI 129). 
2 That Wittgenstein was blinded by the idea of a “picture-theory of meaning” is profoundly ironic; but it is an irony 
not lost on Wittgenstein himself. Throughout this paper, references to Wittgenstein’s work include both his writings 
and pedagogical practices. 
3 For further discussion see Janik and Toulmin (1973) and Savickey (1999) and (2013). 
4 These descriptions also appear to equate the use of language with being human (denying it of those who have 
few words or do not speak). 
5 My thanks to Severin Schroeder for this reference. 
6 The shopkeeper example occurs during Kant’s discussion of action done from (or in conformity with) duty, 
immediate inclination, or self-interest (Kant 4, 397). Hegel’s example occurs within a discussion of the scientific 
method. He claims that the scientific method consists of labelling all that is in heaven and earth with a few 
determinations of a general schema, and pigeon-holing everything (Hegel 1977, 31). 
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